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Abstract
We consider a moral hazard problem with multiple principals in a continuous-time model.
The agent can only work exclusively for one principal at a given time, so faces an optimal
switching problem. Using a randomized formulation, we manage to represent the agent’s
value function and his optimal effort by an Itô process. This representation further helps
to solve the principals’ problem in case we have infinite number of principals in the sense
of mean field game. Finally the mean field formulation is justified by an argument of
propagation of chaos.
MSC 2010 Subject Classification: 91B40, 93E20
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1 Introduction
The principal-agent problem is a study of optimizing the incentives, so central in economics.
In particular, the optimal contracting between the two parties, principal and agent(s), is called
moral hazard, when the agent’s effort is not observable by the principal. It has been widely
applied in many areas of economics and finance, for example in corporate finance (see [BD05]).
More recently, we also witness the works [APT18, AEE+17] using the principal-agent formula-
tion to study how to encourage people to embrace the energy transition.
While the research on the discrete-time model can be dated back further, the first paper
on continuous-time principal-agent problem is the seminal work by Holmström and Milgrom
[HM87], who study a simple continuous-time model in which the agent gets paid at the end
of a finite time interval. They show that optimal contracts are linear in aggregate output
when the agent has exponential utility with a monetary cost of effort. The advantage of the
continuous-time model is further explored by Sannikov [San08]. Not only he considers a new
model which allows the agent to retire, but also (and more importantly in the mathematical
perspective) he introduces new dynamic insights to the principal-agent problem, and it leads to
simple computational procedure to find the optimal contract by solving an ordinary differential
equation in his case.
Later, the idea of Sannikov is interpreted and introduced to the mathematical finance com-
munity by Cvitanić, Possamäı and Touzi [CPT18]. Let us illustrate their contribution with a
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toy model. Denote by ξ the contract paid at the end of a finite time interval [0, T ]. Assume the
agent faces the following optimization:
max
α
E
[
ξ(Xα)−
∫ T
0
c(αt)dt
]
, where dXαt = dWt − αtdt.
The crucial observation in [CPT18] is that both the contract ξ and the Agent’s best response
α∗[ξ] can be characterized by the following backward stochastic differential equation (in short,
BSDE, for readers not familiar with BSDE we refer to [PP90, EPQ97], and in particular to
[CZ13] for the applications on the contract theory):
dYt = −c∗(Zt)dt+ ZtdWt, YT = ξ, where c∗(z) = max
a
{
az − c(a)
}
, (1.1)
namely, ξ = YT and α
∗
t [Z] = arg maxa
{
aZt − c(a)
}
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This induces a natural
(forward) representation of the couple (ξ, α∗[ξ]):ξ = Y
Y0,Z
T := Y0 −
∫ T
0
c∗(Zt)dt+
∫ T
0
ZtdWt
α∗t [ξ] := α
∗
t [Z] = arg max
a
{
aZt − c(a)
}
, for all t ∈ [0, T ]
for some (Y0, Z),
and this neat representation transforms the once puzzling principal’s problem to be a classical
dynamic programming problem, namely,
max
ξ
E
[
U
(
X
α∗[ξ]
T − ξ
) ]
= max
Y0,Z
E
[
U
(
X
α∗[Z]
T − Y
Y0,Z
T
) ]
.
This applaudable idea of representation is further applied to study the case where the principal
can hire multiple agents [EPar]. Eventually, in [EMPar] the authors follow the same machinery
to study the model where the principal hires infinite number of agents using the formulation
of mean field games (as for the mean field game we refer to the seminal paper [LL07] and the
recent books [CD18a] and [CD18b]).
There are fewer existing literature considering the model with multiple principals. In [MR18]
the authors consider the case where the several principals hire one common agent at the same
time (i.e. the agent simultaneously works on different projects for different principals). However,
to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet considered a n-principal/1-agent model where the
agent can only exclusively work for one principal at a given time. In such a model, the agent is
facing an optimal switching (among the principals) problem. According to the classic literature
of optimal switching, see e.g. [PVZ09, HZ10, HT10, CEK11], the counterpart of the BSDE
characterization (1.1) for the agent’s problem would be a system of reflected BSDE in the form:
dYt = −ft(Yt, Zt)dt+ ZtdWt − dKt, YT = ξ,
where K is an increasing process satisfying some (backward) Skorokhod condition. The presence
of the process K and its constraint make it difficult to find a representation of the couple
(ξ, α∗[ξ]) as in [CPT18]. In this paper, we propose an alternative facing this difficulty. Instead of
letting the agent choose stopping times to change his employers, we study a randomized optimal
switching problem where the switching time is modelled by a random time characterized by a
Poisson point process and the agent influences the random time by controlling the intensity of
the Poisson point process. It is fair to note that similar randomized formulations of switching
have been discussed in the literature, see e.g. [Bou09, EK10]. In such framework, we may
characterize (ξ, α∗[ξ]) by the solution to a system of BSDEs (without reflection).
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Unfortunately, this characterization of the agent’s problem and the corresponding represen-
tation do not help us to solve simply the principals’ problem. We observe that the optimizations
the principals face are time-inconsistent, and thus cannot be solved by dynamic programming.
However, we also note that this time-inconsistency disappears once the number of principals
tends to infinity. In the setting of infinite number of principals, it is natural to adopt the for-
mulation of mean field game. We prove the existence of mean field equilibrium largely based
on the recipes in Lacker [Lac15]. Further, in order to justify our mean field game formulation,
we introduce a machinery which we name ‘backward propagation of chaos’ which may carry
independent interest itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state our moral hazard prob-
lem with n-principal and one agent, we shall solve the agent’s problem under the previously
mentioned randomized optimal switching formulation, and observe the time-inconsistency of
the n-principal problem. Then in section 3, we shall derive the mean field game among the
principals, prove its existence, and justify it using the “backward propagation of chaos” tech-
nique.
2 Moral hazard problem : n principals and one agent
In this paper we consider the principal-agent problem on the a finite time horizon [0, T ] for
some T > 0. The main novelty is to introduce the new model and method to allow the agent to
choose working for different employers. In this section, we set up the model in which one agent
switches among n different principals.
For the agent, the set of possible regimes is In := {1, 2, · · · , n}. Denote by C([0, T ];Rn) the
set of continuous functions from [0, T ] to Rn, endowed with the supremum norm ‖ · ‖T , where
‖x‖t := sup
0≤s≤t
|xs|, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ C([0, T ];Rn).
Denote by D([0, T ], In) the set of càdlàg functions from [0, T ] to In. We introduce the canonical
space Ω := C([0, T ];Rn)×D([0, T ]; In), denote the canonical process by (X, I), and the canonical
filtration by F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ]. The process Xt represents the outputs of the principals and It
records for which principal the agent is working at time t. Denote by FX the filtration generated
by the process X alone. We also define P0 as the Wiener measure on C([0, T ],Rn).
In our model, for simplicity, the output process follows the dynamic
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
eIsds+Wt, where ei = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0)> ∈ Rn, (2.1)
that is, the principal employing the agent has a constant-1 drift while outputs of the others just
follow the Brownian motions. The agent controls the process I, that is, he switches from one
employer to another so as to maximize his utility:
V A0 (ξ, w) = sup
I
E
[
n∑
i=1
ξi1{IT=i} +
∫ T
0
wit1{It=i}du− “cost of switching”
]
, (2.2)
where ξi is the reward at the terminal time T , wi is the wage payed by principal i, and the
cost of switching will be defined later when we analyze the agent’s problem in detail. Naturally,
the payment ξi should be an FXT -measurable random variable and wi should be an FX -adapted
process.
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Remark 2.1. The upcoming method can easily handle the output process:
dXt = b(t,Xt, It)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt,
where b, σ are uniformly Lipschitz in x. However, for the simplification of notations, we prefer
to focus on the form of (2.1).
It is the n principals that provide the contracts {(ξi, wi)}i∈In . Among them, they search for
a Nash equilibrium so as to maximize their profits:
V P,i0 = max
(ξi,wi)
E
[
Xi,ξ
i
T − U(ξ
i)1{IT=i} −
∫ T
0
U(wit)1{It=i}dt
]
, (2.3)
where Xi,ξ
i
denotes the optimal output process controlled by the agent.
As in [San08] and [CPT18], we are going to provide a representation of the value function
of the agent’s problem so as to solve the principals’ problem by dynamic programming.
2.1 Agent’s problem
In our model, instead of allowing the agent to control the process I in a “singluar” way, we
assume that I is driven by a Poisson random measure (p.r.m.) and allow the agent to control
its intensity. More precisely, in the weak formulation of stochastic control, the agent aims at
choosing his optimal control among:{
Pα ∈ P(Ω) : Pα-a.s. (2.1) holds true and dIt =
∫
In
(k − It−)µ(dt, dk),
where µ is a p.r.m. with intensity α(dt, ·) =
∑
k∈In
αkt δkdt,
for some nonnegative F-adapted (αk)k∈In , W and µ are independent
}
,
where P(Ω) is the set of all probability measures on Ω.
Remark 2.2. Define the first jump time of the process I:
τt := inf{s ≥ t : Is 6= It}. (2.4)
It follows from the Girsanov theorem for multivariate point processes (see e.g. [Jac75]) that for
any FX -adapted processes {θ(i)}i∈In we have
EP
α
t
[
θτt(Iτt)1{τt≤s, Iτt=j}
]
= EP
α
t
[∫ s
t
βIt,α(t, u)αjuθu(j)du
]
, for all j ∈ In and j 6= It,
as well as Pα
[
τt > s
∣∣Fs] = βIt,α(t, s), where βi,α(t, s) := exp(− ∫ s
t
∑
j 6=i
αjudu
)
.
These results will be useful in the upcoming calculus.
With the intensity α introduced as above, we can now make it precise how to define the cost
of switching in (2.2). Given n contracts {(ξi, wi)}i∈In , the agent solves the following optimal
switching problem
V A0 = sup
α
EP
α
[
n∑
i=1
ξi1{IT=i} +
∫ T
0
( n∑
i=1
wiu1{Iu=i} −
1
n− 1
∑
i 6=Iu
c
(
(n− 1)αiu
))
du
]
. (2.5)
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Intuitively, the intensity process α describes the hesitation of changing employer. The bigger α
is, the less hesitation the agent has to change his employer. The normalization 1n−1c
(
(n− 1) ·
)
is for later use, as n→∞.
As in the classical literature of the optimal switching problems, we shall use the dynamic
programming principle to obtain the system of equations characterizing the value function.
First, define the dynamic version of (2.5):
V At = ess sup
α
EP
α
t
[
n∑
i=1
ξi1{IT=i} +
∫ T
t
( n∑
i=1
wiu1{Iu=i} −
1
n− 1
∑
i 6=Iu
c
(
(n− 1)αiu
))
du
]
.
Recall τt defined in (2.4). By the dynamic programming, we have
V At = ess sup
α
EP
α
t
[
n∑
i=1
ξi1{IT=i, τt>T} + V
A
τt 1{τt≤T}
+
∫ τt∧T
t
( n∑
i=1
wiu1{Iu=i} −
1
n− 1
∑
i 6=Iu
c
(
(n− 1)αiu
))
du
]
.
Further, by defining V A,it := V
A
t |It=i, we obtain
V A,it = ess sup
α
EP
α
t
[
ξi1{τ it>T} +
∑
j 6=i
(
V A,jτt 1{τt≤T, Iτt=j} +
∫ τt∧T
t
wiu − c
(
(n− 1)αju
)
n− 1
du
)]
= ess sup
α
EP
α
t
[
ξiβi,α(t, T ) +
∫ T
t
βi,α(t, u)
∑
j 6=i
(
αjuV
A,j
u +
wiu − c
(
(n− 1)αju
)
n− 1
)
du
]
. (2.6)
The second equality above is due to the results in Remark 2.2. In view of (2.6), it becomes
a classical stochastic control problem. In particular, the value function of this control problem
can be characterized by the BSDE.
Assumption 2.3. Assume that the cost function c is convex and lower semicontinuous, and c
takes value of +∞ out of a compact set K. We also assume that there exists a unique maximizer
a∗(y) := arg max
a≥0
{
ay − c(a)
}
∈ K, for all y ∈ R.
Define the convex conjugate of c
c∗(y) := sup
a≥0
{
ay − c(a)
}
, for all y ∈ R.
Further assume that c∗ is Lipschitz continuous.
Proposition 2.4. Under Assumption 2.3, given ξi ∈ L2(P0), wi ∈ H2(P0)1 for all i ∈ In, the
following system of BSDEs has a unique solution (Y i, Zi)i∈In :
Y it = ξ
i +
∫ T
t
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
c∗(Y ju − Y iu) + wiu + eiZiu
)
du−
∫ T
t
Ziu · dXu, i ∈ In, P0-a.s. (2.7)
1We denote by H2(P0) the space of progressively measurable processes w such that
‖w‖2H2(P0) := E
P0
[(∫ T
0
|wu|2du
) 1
2
]
< ∞.
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Moreover, we have Y i = V A,i, P0-a.s. In particular, the optimal intensity satisfies
αj,∗t =
1
n− 1
a∗
(
Y jt − Y
It
t
)
, j 6= It, for all t ∈ [0, T ], P0-a.s. (2.8)
Proof. In view of the control problem (2.6), the corresponding BSDE reads
Y it = ξ
i +
∫ T
t
(
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sup
aj≥0
{
(n− 1)aj
(
Y ju − Y iu
)
− c
(
(n− 1)aj
)}
+ wiu + eiZ
i
u
)
du
−
∫ T
t
Ziu · dXu.
Then, (2.7) follows from the definition of c∗. Since all the coefficients are Lipschitz continuous,
the wellposedness of the BSDE system and the verification for the control problem is classical,
see e.g. [PP90].
2.2 Principals’ problem: time inconsistency
In the previous section, we managed to represent the value function of the agent by an Itô
process (Proposition 2.4). As in [San08, CPT18], we expect this representation would help us
solve the principals’ problem by dynamic programming. However, in this model, this approach
does not work. We shall explain in the case n = 2 for the simplification of notation.
Consider the set of all contracts
Ξ :=
{{
(ξi, wi)
}
i=1,2
: ξi ∈ L2(P0), wi ∈ H2(P0) and V A(ξ, w) ≥ R
}
,
whereR is the reservation value of the agent for whom only the contracts such that V A(ξ, w) ≥ R
are acceptable. Now define
V :=
{{
(Y i0 , Z
i)
}
i=1,2
: Y i0 ≥ R, Zi ∈ H2(P0), i = 1, 2
}
.
It follows from Proposititon 2.4 that
Ξ =
{{
(ξi, wi)
}
i=1,2
: wi ∈ H2(P0) and ξi = Y
i,Y i0 ,Z
i,wi
T , where Y
i,Y i0 ,Z
i,wi satisfies
Y iT = Y
i
0 +
∫ T
0
(
c∗
(
Y jt − Y it
)
+ wit + eiZ
i
t
)
dt−
∫ T
0
Zit · dXt, P0-a.s.,
with j 6= i and
{
(Y i0 , Z
i)
}
i=1,2
∈ V
}
.
For simplicity of notation, if there is no ambiguity, we write simply Y i instead of Y i,Y
i
0 ,Z
i,wi .
But just keep in mind that the process Y i is controlled by Zi and wi with initial value Y i0 .
The corresponding optimal intensity reads α∗t =
(
a∗(Y 2t − Y 1t )1{It=1}, a∗(Y 1t − Y 2t )1{It=2}
)
.
Therefore, the principals are searching for a Nash equilibrium so as to maximize:
V P,i0 = sup
(ξi,wi)
EP
α∗
[
XiT − U(ξi)1{IT=i} −
∫ T
0
U(wit)1{It=i}dt
]
= sup
(Y i0 ,Z
i,wi)
EP
α∗
[
XiT − U(Y iT )1{IT=i} −
∫ T
0
U(wit)1{It=i}dt
]
= sup
Y i0≥R
J i0(Y
i
0 ),
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where
J i0(Y0) := sup
(Zi,wi)
EP
α∗
[
XiT − U
(
Y
i,Y i0 ,Z
i,wi
T
)
1{IT=i} −
∫ T
0
U(wit)1{It=i}dt
]
.
Up to now, we are applying the same strategy as in [CPT18]. Assume the control problem is
time-consistent, that is, admits dynamic programming. Fix Y0 and define the dynamic version
of J i0:
J it (Y
i
t ) := ess sup
(Zi,wi)
EP
α∗
t
[
XiT − U(Y iT )1{IT=i} −
∫ T
t
U(wiu)1{Iu=i}du
]
.
Defining J i,1t := J
i
t (Y
i
t )|It=1 and J
i,2
t = J
i
t (Y
i
t )|It=2 according to the different regimes, we expect
to have for i = 1
J1,1t = ess sup
(Z1,w1)
EP
α∗
t
[(
X1T − U(Y 1T )
)
1{τt>T} + J
1,2
τt 1{τt≤T} −
∫ τt∧T
t
U(w1u)du
]
= ess sup
(Z1,w1)
EP
α∗
t
[
β1,∗(t, T )
(
X1T − U(Y 1T )
)
+
∫ T
t
β1,∗(t, u)a∗
(
Y 2u − Y 1u
)(
J1,2u − U(w1u)
)
du
]
(2.9)
where
dX1t = dt+ dW
1
t , β
1,∗(t, s) := exp
(
−
∫ s
t
a∗(Y 2u − Y 1u )du
)
,
and similarly
J1,2t = ess sup
(Z1,w1)
EP
α∗
t
[
X1T1{τt>T} + J
1,1
τt 1{τt≤T}
]
= ess sup
(Z1,w1)
EP
α∗
t
[
β2,∗(t, T )X1T +
∫ T
0
β2,∗(t, u)a∗(Y 1u − Y 2u )J1,1u du
]
(2.10)
where
dX1t = dW
1
t , β
2,∗(t, s) := exp
(
−
∫ s
t
a∗(Y 1t − Y 2t )du
)
.
Although it seems promising to solve the system of value functions (J i,1, J i,2) as in the agent
problem, note that the admissible controls (Zi, wi) are constrained to be FX -adapted, in par-
ticular, (Zi, wi) cannot depend on the regimes. Since the optimizations in (2.9) and (2.10) are
not symmetric, we cannot expect that the optimal controls (Zi, wi) coincide on the different
regimes. Therefore, it is a contradiction to the alleged time-consistency.
This time-inconsistency appears in our model, if we consider a finite number of principals.
In the following section, we shall bypass the difficulty in the case of infinite number of principals,
using the mean field formulation.
Remark 2.5. Besides, the approach for solving the n-principal problem has another drawback.
Note that each contract ξi for i ∈ In is a function of the entire vector X, that is, the principal
need to know the other companies’ performance in order to design his own contract. This
problem can be also avoided in the mean field approach, where ξi will be a function of Xi.
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3 Infinite number of principals: mean field approach
3.1 Heuristic analysis
Heuristically, as n → ∞ the equation (2.7), which characterizes the agent’s value function,
converges to
dY it = −
(∫
c∗(y − Y it )pt(dy) + wit + Zit
)
dt+ ZitdX
i
t , pt = L(Y it ). (3.1)
Besides, it follows from (2.8) and the definition of the discount factor β that the optimal α∗
and β∗ converge to
αj,∗t → 0 for j 6= i,
∑
j 6=i
αj,∗t → α∗t :=
∫
a∗(y − Y it )pt(dy), (3.2)
and βn,∗t → β∗t := e−
∫ t
0 α
∗
sds.
Remark 3.1. • To be fair, the form of the limit equation (3.1) does not entirely follow
the intuition. Note that we removed the ei in front of the term Z
i
tdt and replaced the
stochastic integrator dXt by dX
i
t . At this stage, let us admit that once in the drift of the
BSDE there is no longer dependence on other Y j (j 6= i), the system would be decoupled,
that is, the equation of Y i no longer needs the information of Xj (j 6= i), and it leads to
the limit form (3.1). We will justify the mean field formulation in Section 3.3.
• The first observation in (3.2) implies that in the limit case once the agent leaves the com-
pany i, he will have null probability to come back. Therefore, the principal should be only
interested in the optimization for the regime where the agent works for her. Remember
that in the n-principal problem, the time-inconsistency is due to the optimizations in the
different regimes. Therefore, it is reasonable that the mean field formulation would bypass
this difficulty.
Recall the principal’s problem (2.3). It follows from the observation in Remark 3.1 that
V P,i0 =

EPα
∗
[Xi0 +WT ] = X
i
0, as I0 6= i,
max
(ξi,wi)
EP
α∗
[
Xiτ1{τ≤T} +
(
XiT − U(ξi)
)
1{τ>T} −
∫ τ∧T
0
U(wiu)du
]
, as I0 = i.
Therefore, in the upcoming mean field game, we should only keep the nontrivial regime (I0 = i),
i.e., denote
V P,i0 := max
(ξi,wi)
EP
α∗
[
Xiτ1{τ≤T} +
(
XiT − U(ξi)
)
1{τ>T} −
∫ τ∧T
0
U(wiu)du
]
= max
(ξi,wi)
EP
α∗
[∫ T
0
α∗uβ
∗
u
(
Xiu − U(wiu)
)
du+ β∗T
(
XiT − U(ξi)
)]
. (3.3)
Though the rigorous definition of the mean field game will be introduced in the next section,
we are ready to give a simple description of the mean field equilibrium we are searching for.
In the mean field formulation, we remove the superscript i, and instead we use the notations
X,Y , Z. Also note that (Xt− t)t∈[0,T ] is a Pα
∗
-Brownian motion, denoted by W . Following the
dynamic programming approach in [San08, CPT18], given (pt)t∈[0,T ], consider the contracts in
the form:
ξ ∈ Ξ(p) =
{
Y T : Y T = Y 0 −
∫ T
0
(∫
c∗(y − Y u)pu(dy) + wu
)
dt+
∫ T
0
ZudW u
}
.
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It follows from (3.3) that each principal faces the optimization:
V P0 (p) = sup
(Y 0,Z,w)
EP
α∗
[∫ T
0
α∗uβ
∗
u
(
Xu − U(wu)
)
du+ β∗T
(
XT − U(Y T )
)]
. (3.4)
The maximizer
(
Y
∗
0, Z
∗
, w∗
)
would define a process Y
∗
. The law (pt)t∈[0,T ] is a mean field
equilibrium, if pt = L
(
Y
∗
t
)
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
3.2 Mean field game: existence
Our rigorous definition of the mean field game and the argument to prove its existence rely
largely on the framework in Lacker [Lac15].
In this part of the paper, we denote the canonical space by Ω = C([0, T ],R2), the canonical
process by Θ := (X,Y ) and the canonical filtration by F. Given p ∈ P(Ω), define pt := p◦Y −1t ∈
P(R) and
W(p) :=
{
Pλ,η ∈ P(Ω) : Pλ,η-a.s. dXt = dt+ dWt, X0 = x0,
dY t = −
∫ (
c∗(y − Y t)pt(dy) + wt
)
dt+
√
ηtdWt, L(Y 0) = λ,
for some λ ∈ I, η ∈ U
}
where, for technical reasons, we define
I :=
{
λ ∈ P(R) : λ with a compact support K in [R,∞)
}
and U :=
{
η F-adapted : η takes values in a compact set Σ in R+
}
.
In other words, we will consider a mean field game in which the choice of the initial value and
the volatility is constrained in compact sets. Further define
J(P, w; p) := EP
[∫ T
0
α∗uβ
∗
u
(
Xu − U(wu)
)
du+ β∗T
(
XT − U(Y T )
)]
,
where we recall α∗t =
∫
a∗(y − Y t)pt(dy) and β∗t = exp
(
−
∫ t
0 α
∗
sds
)
.
Assumption 3.2. We assume that a∗ : R → R is Lipschitz continuous. U is convex and of
q-polynomial growth, i.e. there are constants C < C ′ and q > 1 such that
C(|w|q − 1) ≤ U(w) ≤ C ′(|w|q + 1).
Theorem 3.3. Under Assumption 2.3 and 3.2, there exists p ∈ P(Ω),
(
λ̂, η̂
)
∈ I × U and an
F-adapted process ŵ such that(
Pλ̂,η̂, ŵ
)
∈ arg min
P∈W(p),w
J(P, w; p) and p = Pλ̂,η̂.
Remark 3.4. • This definition of mean field game via the weak formulation of stochastic
control follows the same spirit as those in Carmona & Lacker [CL15] and Lacker [Lac15].
However, here we also include the control of the initial distribution λ of Y .
• It is noteworthy that among the triple of control (λ, η, w) of this mean field game, λ takes
values of measures, that is, the principals are allowed to play a mixed strategy.
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• If we constrain w to take values in a compact set in R, then given a bounded function U
which is convex on this compact set, the mean field game exists.
We realize that Theorem 3.3 can be proved by largely the same argument as in [Lac15]. In
the rest of the section, we shall outline the strategy of the proof and refer the readers for details
to the well-written paper [Lac15].
First, we shall linearize the functional J using the so-called relaxed control. Denote by
D the set of measures q on [0, T ] × Σ × R. Instead of controlling via the processes η (taking
values in Σ) and w (taking values in R), we shall control through the measure q in the relaxed
formulation. The canonical space for the relaxed control becomes Ω̂ := Ω × D. Denote the
canonical process by (X,Y ,Λ), and the canonical filtration by F̂. Note that one may define a
P(Σ×R)-valued F̂-predictable process (Λt)0≤t≤T such that Λ(dt, dη, dw) = Λt(dη, dw)dt. Here
we abuse the notations using η, w to represent points in (Σ,R).
Denote by C∞0 (R2) denote the set of infinitely differentiable functions φ : R2 7→ R with
compact support. Define the generator L on C∞0 (R2) by
Lp,ηφ(t, x, y) =
(
1,−
∫
c∗(y′ − y)pt(dy′)− wt
)
∇φ+ 1
2
(
∂xxφ+ η∂yyφ+ 2
√
η∂xyφ
)
,
for (t, x, y, p, η) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 × P(Ω)× Σ. Further define
Mp,φt := φ(Xt, Y t)−
∫ t
0
∫
Σ×R
Lp,ηφ(s,Xs, Y s)Λs(dη)ds
Definition 3.5. Given p ∈ P(Ω), define the set of the controlled martingale problems:
R(p) =
{
P̂ ∈ P
(
Ω̂
)
: P̂-a.s. X0 = x0, Y 0 ∼ λ, for some λ ∈ I,
EP̂
[∫ T
0
|Λt|qdt
]
<∞, (3.5)
Mp,φ is a P̂-martingale for each φ ∈ C∞0 (R2)
}
,
where |Λt|q :=
∫
Σ×R |(η, w)|
qΛt(dη, dw).
Further, in the relaxed formulation the object function of the principals reads:
Ĵ(P̂; p) := EP̂
[∫ T
0
∫
R
α∗uβ
∗
u
(
Xu − U(w)
)
Λu(dw)du+ β
∗
T
(
XT − U(Y T )
)]
,
and define the set of the optimal control:
R∗(p) := arg max
P̂∈R(p)
Ĵ
(
P̂; p
)
.
We say P̂ ∈ P(Ω̂) is a relaxed mean field game if P̂ ∈ R∗
(
P̂ ◦ (X,Y )−1
)
.
Theorem 3.6. Under Assumption 2.3 and 3.2, there exists a relaxed mean field game.
Proof. Our setting slightly distinguishes from the one in [Lac15], because we allow to control
the initial law λ of Y . However, since we constrain the choice of λ among the distribution in
P(K) where K is a compact set in R, we are still able to prove the tightness of R(p) (in the case
Λ is truncated), and the rest of the argument would follow the same lines in [Lac15, Section 4
and 5].
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It remains to construct a strict mean field game (as in Theorem 3.3) based on a relaxed one.
Again we can follow the classical argument. We shall only provide the sketch of the proof, for
more details we refer the readers to [Lac15, Proof of Theorem 3.7]
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let P̂ be a relaxed mean field game. First, we may find an F-adapted
process q̂ : [0, T ]× Ω→ P(Σ× R) such that
q̂(t,X, Y ) = EP̂[Λt|F t], P̂-a.s. t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.6)
Further, for each (t, x, y, p) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×P(Ω), since α∗, β∗ are always nonnegative and function
U is convex, the following subset
K(t, x, y, p) :=
{
(η, w, l) : η ∈ Σ, l ≤ f(t, x, y, p, w) := α∗t (y, p)β∗t (y, p)
(
xt − U(w)
)}
is convex. This verifies the “convexity” assumption in [Lac15, Assumption (Convex)]. Therefore,
using the measurable selection result in [HL90, Lemma 3.1], there exist F-adapted processes η̂, ŵ
and l̂ ≥ 0 such that∫ (
η, f(t, x, y, p, w)
)
q̂(t, x, y)(dη, dw) =
(
η̂(t, x, y), f
(
t, x, y, p, ŵ(t, x, y)
)
− l̂(t, x, y)
)
.
Further, it would be easy to verify that p := P̂ ◦ (X,Y )−1 = Pλ,η̂ as well as J(Pλ,η̂, ŵ; p) ≥
Ĵ(P̂; p). Therefore, we find a mean field game in sense of Theorem 3.3.
From the sketch of proof, we may observe the following.
Corollary 3.7. Under Assumption 2.3 and 3.2, there exists a mean field game such that
EP
λ̂,η̂
[∫ T
0
|ŵu|qdu
]
<∞.
Proof. Note that in the proof of Theorem 3.3, the ŵ we constructed satisfies
C(|ŵt|q − 1) ≤ U(ŵt) ≤
∫
R
U(w)q̂t(dw),
where q̂ is defined in (3.6). Therefore,
CEP
λ̂,η̂
[∫ T
0
|ŵu|qdu
]
≤ C + EP̂
[∫ T
0
∫
R
U(w)Λu(dw)du
]
≤ C + EP̂
[∫ T
0
∫
R
C ′(|w|q + 1)Λu(dw)du
]
.
Then, the desired result follows from (3.5).
3.3 Mean field game: approximation
In this section, we shall justify our mean field formulation, that is, answer the question why
the principals would apply the mean field game we studied in the previous section. Unlike
the classical cases, recall that in our n-player problem the stochastic control problem is time-
inconsistent. Therefore, it would be difficult to verify whether a contract provided by the mean
field game would be ε-optimal for the n-player game. Instead, we shall verify that using a
contract provided by the mean field game, the principals would receive, in a n-player game, a
utility ε-close to the value function calculated in the mean field game.
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3.3.1 Agent problem: backward propagation of chaos
Here we shall analyze the agent’s behavior, once he is given n contracts provided by the mean
field game. Note that the mean field contract has the form:
ξ = Y 0 −
∫ T
0
(∫
R
c∗(y − Y u)p∗u(dy) + wu +
√
ηu
)
du+
∫ T
0
√
ηudXu. (3.7)
In this section, we shall assume that the contract (ξ, w) is FX,Y 0T -measurable, that is, we may
write ξ(X,Y 0) and w(X,Y 0). Now, recall the canonical space Ω in the setting of n-principal
problem, and the canonical process X = {Xi}i∈In representing the outputs of all principals.
Further, let {(Y ∗,i, ξi, wi, ηi)}i∈In be the n independent copies of (Y , ξ, w, η) such that
Y ∗,it = ξ
i +
∫ T
t
(∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy) + wiu +
√
ηiu
)
du−
∫ T
t
√
ηiudX
i
u
= ξi +
∫ T
t
(∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy) + wiu + eiZ∗,iu
)
du−
∫ T
t
Z∗,iu · dXu, (3.8)
with Z∗,i := ei
√
ηi =
(
0, · · · , 0,
√
ηi, 0, · · · , 0
)>
.
In this section, we shall simply use the notation E instead of EPλ̂,η̂ . The following estimate
follows directly from Corollary 3.7.
Lemma 3.8. Assume q ≥ 2 in Assumption 3.2. Then we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣Y ∗,it ∣∣2
]
<∞
In particular E[|ξi|2] <∞.
Given such contracts {(ξi, wi)}i∈In , the agent would solve the system of BSDE (2.7), namely,
Y n,it = ξ
i +
∫ T
t
(
1
n−1
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
c∗(Y n,ju − Y n,iu ) + wiu + eiZn,iu
)
du−
∫ T
t
Zn,iu · dXu
= ξi +
∫ T
t
(
n
n−1
∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )pnu(dy)−
c∗(0)
n−1 + w
i
u + eiZ
n,i
u
)
du−
∫ T
t
Zn,iu · dXu, (3.9)
where pn is the empirical measure 1n
∑n
j=1 δY j and p
n
u :=
1
n
∑n
j=1 δY ju . Define ∆Y
i := Y n,i−Y ∗,i,
∆Zi := Zn,i − Z∗,i. Let C := C([0, T ];R). Denote the square of the Wasserstein-2 distance on
P2(C) by
d2t (µ, ν) := inf
π∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
C×C
sup
t≤u≤T
|xu − yu|2π(dx, dy).
Here is the main result concerning the agent’s problem.
Proposition 3.9. Assume that the contract (ξ, w) is FX,Y 0T -measurable and Assumption 2.3
and 3.2 hold true for some q ≥ 2. Then we have
lim
n→∞
E
[
d20 (p
n, p∗)
]
= 0. (3.10)
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Remark 3.10. • There is a certain similarity between the previous result and the one in
[BDLP09] where the authors also study the convergence from a n-player BSDE to the
mean field limit equation in the form of (3.8). To our understanding of their paper, the
solution to the n-player BSDE there is a fixed point of the following map:
p 7→ Y (p) 7→ 1
n
n∑
i=1
δY i(p),
where Y (p) is the solution of the BSDE
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
(∫
R
c∗(y − Yu)pu(dy) + wu + Zu
)
du−
∫ T
t
ZudXu, (3.11)
and {Y i(p)}i∈In are the independent copies of Y (p). In other words, their formulation of
the n-player problem is via the open loop while ours is via the closed loop. Another crucial
difference between the two limit results is that the solution (Y,Z) to (3.11) is adapted
in the filtration generated by (p,X), in particular, note that X is of 1-dimension, while
the solution {(Y n,i, Zn,i)}i∈In to our n-player BSDE system is adapted in the filtration
generated by X, the n-dimensional process.
• As we will show, the technique involved to prove Proposition 3.9 is a combination of the
BSDE estimates and the argument for proving the propagation of chaos. That is why we
would name this section the backward propagation of chaos.
• Indeed the result of Proposition 3.9 and the upcoming analysis hold valid for the broader
class of BSDE systems in the form of
Y n,it = ξ
i +
∫ T
t
F (t, Y n,i, Zn,i, pnt )dt− Z
n,i
t dXt, i ∈ In,
where F is Lipschitz continuous in (y, z, p). Apparently, this result could have an inde-
pendent interest, once one want to look into the asymptotic behavior of solutions to such
BSDE systems.
Before proving this main result, we first obtain the following estimates through some classical
BSDE arguments.
Lemma 3.11. We have
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|∆Y is |2
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
t
d2u(p
n, p∗)du
]
, (3.12)
and E
[∫ T
t
|∆Ziu|2du
]
≤ C
(
E
[∫ T
t
d2u(p
n, p∗)du
]
+
1
n2
)
. (3.13)
Proof. Comparing (3.8) and (3.9) we obtain
|∆Y it | ≤
n
n− 1
∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )pnu(dy)−
∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣du+ |c∗(0)|n− 1 T
+
1
n− 1
∫ T
t
∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)du+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
∆Ziu · (dXu − eidu)
∣∣∣∣. (3.14)
13
Using the Kontorovich duality and Lipschitz continuity of c∗, we have∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )pnu(dy)−
∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )pnu(dy)−
∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣ ∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )p∗u(dy)−
∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗u )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤ W1(pnu, p∗u) + L|∆Y iu|
≤ W2(pnu, p∗u) + L|∆Y iu|. (3.15)
Squaring and taking supremum and expectation on both sides of (3.14), and using Jensen and
BDG-inequality, we obtain
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|∆Y is |2
]
≤ CTE
[∫ T
t
W22 (pnu, p∗u)du
]
+ CL,TE
[∫ T
t
|∆Y iu|2du
]
+ CT |c∗(0)|2
+ CTE
[
sup
t≤s≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ s
t
∆Ziu · (dXu − eidu)
∣∣∣∣2
]
+ CTE
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,i)p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣2 du
]
≤ CTE
[∫ T
t
W22 (pnu, p∗u)du
]
+ CL,TE
[∫ T
t
|∆Y iu|2du
]
+ CT |c∗(0)|2 (3.16)
+ CT,BDGE
[∫ T
t
|∆Ziu|2du
]
+ CTE
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,i)p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣2 du
]
.
Further we shall estimate E
[∫ T
t |∆Z
i
u|2du
]
. By Itô’s formula,
|∆Y it |2 +
∫ T
t
|∆Ziu|2du =
2n
n− 1
∫ T
t
∆Y iu
(∫
R
c∗(y − Y n,iu )pnu(dy)−
∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)
)
du
− 2c
∗(0)
n− 1
∫ T
t
∆Y iudu− 2
∫ T
t
∆Y iu∆Z
i
u · (dXu − eidu)
+
2
n− 1
∫ T
t
∆Y iu
∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)du.
Together with (3.15) and Young’s inequality, we obtain
E
[∫ T
t
|∆Ziu|2du
]
≤ 2E
[∫ T
t
|∆Y iu|
(
W2(pnu, p∗u) + CL|∆Y iu|
)
du
]
+
c∗(0)2
(n− 1)2
T
+ 2E
[∫ T
t
|∆Y iu|2du
]
+
1
(n− 1)2
E
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣2 du
]
≤ (3 + 2CL)E
[∫ T
t
|∆Y iu|2du
]
+ E
[∫ T
t
W22 (pnu, p∗u)du
]
+
c∗(0)2
(n− 1)2
T +
1
(n− 1)2
E
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣2 du
]
. (3.17)
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We now estimate the last term above,
E
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣∣∫
R
c∗(y − Y ∗,iu )p∗u(dy)
∣∣∣∣2 du
]
≤ E
[∫ T
t
(∫
R
(
L|y|+ L|Y ∗,iu |+ |c∗(0)|
)
p∗u(dy)
)2
du
]
≤ E
[∫ T
t
(
LE[|Y ∗,iu |] + L|Y ∗,iu |+ |c∗(0)|
)2
du
]
≤ 6L2TE
[
sup
0≤u≤T
|Y ∗,iu |2
]
+ 3T |c∗(0)|2,
which is bounded from above by a constant C0, independent of t and i, by the a priori estimate
for Y ∗,i in Lemma 3.8. Together with (3.16) we obtain
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|∆Y is |2
]
≤ (CT + 2CT,BDG)E
[∫ T
t
W22 (pnu, p∗u)du
]
+
(
CL,T + (4CL + 10)CT,BDG
) ∫ T
t
E
[
sup
u≤s≤T
∣∣∆Y is ∣∣2]du
+ (CT + 4CT,BDGT )c
∗(0)2 + (CT + 2CT,BDG)C0.
Applying Grönwall inequality, we get
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|∆Y is |2
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
t
W22 (pnu, p∗u)du
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
t
d2u(p
n, p∗)du
]
,
that is, the estimate (3.12), for some constant depending on T , L, C0 and the constant from
BDG inequality. Finally, the estimate (3.13) follows from (3.17) and (3.12).
Proof of Proposition 3.9 : Define the empirical measure,
νn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δY ∗,i .
The empirical measure 1n
∑n
i=1 δ(Y n,i,Y ∗,i) is a coupling of the empirical measures p
n and νn, so
d2t (p
n, νn) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
t≤u≤T
∣∣∆Y iu∣∣, a.s.
Together with (3.12), we obtain that
E
[
d2t (p
n, νn)
]
≤ CE
[∫ T
t
d2u(p
n, p∗)du
]
.
Apply the triangle inequality and the previous inequality to obtain
E
[
d2t (p
n, p∗)
]
≤ 2E
[
d2t (p
n, νn)
]
+ 2E
[
d2t (ν
n, p∗)
]
≤ 2CE
[∫ T
t
d2u(p
n, p∗)du
]
+ 2E
[
d2t (ν
n, p∗)
]
.
Using Grönwall’s inequality we obtain
E
[
d20(p
n, p∗)
]
≤ 2e2CTE
[
d20(ν
n, p∗)
]
.
Each νn is the empirical measures of i.i.d. samples from the law p∗, (3.10) follows from the law
of large numbers.
15
3.3.2 Principals’ problem
Recall the third point in Remark 3.4. For technical reasons, in this section we would consider
the case where U is bounded.
Proposition 3.12. Let all the n principals offer the contract provided by a mean field game,
for principal i the reward becomes
V n,i0 =
∫
K
λ(dy0)EP
α∗
[
XiT − U(ξi)1{IT=i} −
∫ T
0
U(wiu)1{Iu=i}du
]
, (3.18)
where α∗ is the optimal intensity of the agent satisfying (2.8). Then, as n→∞, V n,i0 converges
to the value of the mean field game.
Proof. The dynamic version of (3.18) reads
V n,it = E
Pα∗
t
[
XiT − U(ξi)1{IT=i} −
∫ T
t
U(wiu)1{Iu=i}du
]
, for 0 < t ≤ T .
Since U is bounded
EP
α∗
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣V n,it ∣∣2] <∞. (3.19)
We denote V n,i,0t := V
n,i
t
∣∣
It 6=i and V
n,i,1
t := V
n,i
t
∣∣
It=i
on different regimes. Recall τt = inf{s ≥
t : Is 6= It} and define τ t := inf{s ≥ t : Is = i}. By the tower property of the conditional
expectation, we have
V n,i,1t = E
Pα∗
t
[
V n,i,0τt 1{τt≤T} +
(
XiT − U(ξi)
)
1{τt>T} −
∫ τt∧T
t
U(wiu)du
]
V n,i,0t = E
Pα∗
t
[
V n,i,1τ t 1{τ t≤T} +X
i
T1{τ t>T}
]
= EP
α∗
t
[(
V n,i,1τ t −X
i
T
)
1{τ t≤T}
]
+Xit .
(3.20)
It follows from (2.8) that limn→∞ Pα
∗
[τ t ≤ T ] = 0. Together with (3.19), we obtain
lim
n→∞
EP
α∗
[∣∣V n,i,0t −Xit ∣∣2] = 0. (3.21)
Define
Ṽ n,i,10 =
∫
K
λ(dy0)EP
α∗
[∫ T
0
αnuβ
n
u
(
Xiu − U(wiu)
)
du+ βnT
(
XiT − U(ξi)
)]
,
where αnt =
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i a
∗(Y n,jt −Y
n,i
t ) and β
n
t := exp
(
−
∫ t
0 α
n
udu
)
. Note that α∗, β∗ are bounded.
By (3.21), we have
lim
n→∞
∣∣Ṽ n,i,10 − V n,i,10 ∣∣ = 0.
Further, on the regime I = i, the expectation
∫
K λ̂(dy0)E
α∗ [·] coincides with E(=Eλ̂,η̂), so
Ṽ n,i,10 = E
[∫ T
0
αnuβ
n
u
(
Xiu − U(wiu)
)
du+ βnT
(
XiT − U(ξi)
)]
.
Since the function a∗ is bounded and Lipschitz continuous, we have
|βnt − β∗t |2 + |αnt βnt − α∗tβ∗t |2 ≤ C
(
d20(p
n, p∗) +
∣∣Y n,it − Y ∗,it ∣∣2).
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Finally, the convergence result (3.10) and the estimate (3.12) imply that
lim
n→∞
Ṽ n,i,10 = E
[∫ T
0
α∗uβ
∗
u
(
Xiu − U(wiu)
)
du+ β∗T
(
XiT − U(Y
∗,i
T )
)]
,
and the latter is the value of the mean field game.
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